The paper attempts to demonstrate that all of the perpetrators of the grave terrorist attacks in Europe in the recent years have been connected-by one or maximum two links-to the center and leadership of ISIS in Syria, from whom they received ideological, logistical and financial support-thus contradicting the popular theory of lone wolves. The author reaches the conclusion that in many cases addressing potential lone radicals on Jihadist forums before the attacks was nothing else but a special form of Psyop, with the goal of disrupting counterrorism efforts and spreading fear in societies. 
INTRODUCTION
The 9/11 terrorist attacks forced everyone to face the question: how did the unthinkable happen? How could one of the most prepared secret services in the world fail so tragically? Looking for the answer to that question brought forward-if only briefly-the issue of mapping and analyzing the mechanics of terrorist networks. It is essential for counterterrorism organizations to unravel the web of connections between terrorist branches and cells. Although services are certainly making the swiftest possible progress in that respect, there are hardly any comprehensive studies available. Alternatively, to be fair, there are considerably less of them than those investigating the stages of lone radicalization and the options for preventing it.
After 9/11, renowned researcher and hands-on expert on legal social and institutional networks, Valdis Krebs, attempted to compile the web of connections between the perpetrators and define the most typical features of illegal networks.
1 Marc Sageman, in his work on terror
The Legend of the Lone Wolf from those guiding legally operating institutional-social matrices. Yet the majority of this information is barely available to researchers. Krebs basically worked from journals, archives, and courtroom records-with the caveat that a piece of data is considered legitimate only if it is confirmed by at least two reliable sources. 4 On August 21, 2015, on the Thalys TGV en route to Paris, 25-year-old
Moroccan Ayoub El Khazzani opened fire on the passengers, wounding one of them severely with a knife. Besides the Kalashnikov, the attacker carried a semi-automatic handgun and a bottle of gasoline. American soldiers who happened to be travelling on the train subdued him. Even though the perpetrator, upon returning to Europe from Syria, appeared on the radar of several services as a dangerous radicalist, his movements
were not under strict surveillance. In his defense, he claimed that he had been starving and homeless in Belgium, he had only wanted to rob the train, and he had found the weapons in a park. Authorities conducting the proceedings were accused of disregarding the presumption of Were the ties actually as weak as acting authorities may have believed at first and even second sight? We need not go farther than CAT's own database, which Jean-Charles Brisard and his co-author, Kevin Jackson, used in their work. This study uses data partially based on information received from the Hungarian Counter Terrorism Centre and draws on the rich collection of terrorist profiles compiled by Emma Webb and Robert
Sutton. 6 All we have to do is collect publicly available data, examine details, which may seem unimportant at first, and connect the dots to gain a clear understanding of the strong ties between the aforementioned actors. We can see that these francophone perpetrators belonged to operative cells that had returned from Syria and had received their training from KAM. Which is not to say that their difficult childhood or family background could not have contributed to their internal process of radicalization. However, from a counterterrorism perspective this has no bearing on the fact that not one of these combatants fits the profile of a "lone wolf"-neither is it true that local Islamist cells or communities were reports of him visiting hardware and gardening supply stores.
Immediately after the bombing, police statements suggested that the attacker was highly likely to have been acting alone. an Uzbek-Uygur cell from Anatolya, which was already preparing the plot for a second, similar attack. 24 We know even less of the fact that "Uygur terrorist activities exist outside of the borders of China." 25 In Europe, some experts predict, returning "foreign fighters" may add to the numbers of radical Islamists posing a threat. Detailed review of these trends is, however, outside the scope of this article.
Krebs, and others, drew the map of terrorist networks primarily with regard to operative cells. For a more comprehensive view, we should also consider a different system of layers one that is significantly more difficult to pinpoint since it is integrated loosely, flexibly, and colorfully into society than operative units or the central core of terrorist organizations. In expert circles, there is increasing focus given to so- We know little about the networks used by the Islamic State to sell oil, natural gas, or phosphate. It is also a question how, through what network of intermediaries they could find buyers globally for the valuable artifacts they also sold illegally for profit. We must therefore consider the peculiar interdependence and convergence between international organized crime and terrorist organizations-an issue that is too massive to tackle on these pages.
If our investigation concerns the present rather than the past, it is usually near impossible to provide detailed and unquestionable evidence of a "Careful analysis of the military conflict between Russia and Ukraine shows how Russians (partly due to international backlash and sanctions) mobilize their armed forces in "waves:" in close coordination with directly and indirectly planned operations and activities, but in small contingents. Success is the sum of "minor victories," and the final outcome is the triumph of the comprehensive strategy." 
CONCLUSION
However far-fetched it may sound, a hypothesis to consider is the possibility that announcing and adopting a strategy with lone perpetrators in the forefront may serve a double purpose as diversive propaganda:
spreading fear and insecurity among civilians and misleading police and intelligence forces. This psychological operation is part of large-scale psychological warfare. Thus, feeding the legend of the "lone wolf" is probably a means of asymmetric warfare with the aim of maintaining control, keeping the enemy in the dark and provoking reactions.
The media, experts and politicians-including Europol and President
Obama-for years claimed that the "lone wolf" posed the utmost security threat. However, Marc Trevidic, France's chief counter-terrorism judge made the intriguing statement after his retirement that lone wolf attacks were used as a "smoke screen" that "served to put all our agencies on edge" and "allowed them to calmly prepare." He also warned that while these attacks distract security forces, terrorist organizations are planning "huge atrocities" across Europe.
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On a final note, it is apparent how the legend of the "lone wolf" as a terrorist propaganda device in the service of psychological warfare has become pervasive in European media. It could not have reached so many and become so widely adopted without the aid of political and civilian groups in desperate search for narratives to diminish the threats associated with the increasing waves of illegal migration.
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